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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE' CASE 
This is an action involving a dispute of the ownership 
of a strip of land approximately 70 feet by 969 feet located 
between the Plaintiff's (Appellant's) property on the west, 
and the Defendant's (Respondent's.) property on the east.. The 
Appellants claim that their predecessors in title acquired 
ownership of the disputed strip of land through "boundary by 
acquiescence", establishing an "old fence" line which had 
defined the boundary between the properties for more than 
forty-five (45) years as the boundary line; and that said 
predecessors then conveyed ownership to the Plaintiffs/-
Appellants through deeds, which have transferred ownership of 
the disputed strip of land to the Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
The Defendants/Respondents claim that their title is 
based upon surveys and deeds from their predecessors. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The trial court 
entered judgment quieting title to the disputed strip of land 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to the Defendants/Respondents, concluding that the Plaintiffs 
could not have relied upon the "old fence" as their boundary 
line because they were charged with actual or constructive 
notice of the recorded boundary line of MEADOW COVE NO. 2 
SUBDIVISION, when they purchased their lots. 
This Court, in a unanimous opinion, filed December 18, 
1980, reversed the decision of the trial court, quieting 
title therein to the Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellants seek the denial of Respondents PETITION 
FOR REHEARING, thus affirming this Courts decision published 
on December 18, 1980, and quieting title in the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involves a dispute to the ownership of a 
strip of land 70 feet by 969 feet, as shown on the plat 
hereafter as PARCEL (1). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ALBERT DEAN 
PARCEL (3) 
Page 3 
PLAT OF PROPERTY 
(BRANDON.PARK SUBDIVISION) 
W. 0. NELSON . 
PARCEL (4) 
Old Fence 
Parcel (1) 
MC DONALD BROTHERS 
PARCEL (5) 
I
I 
1 
White Fence 
i, __ .._,. ___ l___ , __ M_e_j .... 1 d_o_w_<..,...~ove iubai111i.si4 
No. 2 
I I ( l~eyno ~d Johnson1) l j . Pa ·eel ( 2) j 
I 
The appellants are owners of the lots in Meadow Cove 
No. 2 Subdivision, Parcel (2) on the plat. Meadow Cove 
Subdivision was developed by PORTER BROS., in 1973 .. When 
PORTER BROS. acquired the property they thought their 
property went east to the "old fence", [Record p. 188, 189] 
however when they hired Bush & Gudgell to survey for their 
subdivision, upon the surveyors advice [Record p. 12] they 
accepted the east boundary of the subdivision to be seventy 
( 7 0 ) feet west of the "o 1 d fence " [Record p • 18 8 , 18 9 ] even 
though the subdivision plat does not agree with the deeded 
description from Reynold Johnson, their predecessor in title 
[Record p. 295]. 
Until Porter Brothers developed Meadow Cove Subdivision 
in 1973, all the property shown on the plat as parcels (1), 
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(2), (3), (4) and (5) were open fields divided only by the 
"old fence" [Record p. 214, 215]. 
The "old fence" was built prior to 1925 when Albert 
Dean, moved onto Parcel ( 3) [Record p. 205] and when he 
purchased Parcel ( 3) in 1935, he was informed that the "old 
fence" was the west boundary of his property [Record p. 206]. 
From that time until 1973, for a period of at least 48 
years, the undisputed evidence shows that the owners on both 
sides of the "old fence" acquiesced in the "6ld fence" as the 
boundary 1 ine between the properties [Record p. 314, 315, 
320, 212, 213, 222]. 
The Appellant's predecessor in title, Reynold Johnson 
purchas_ed the property ref erred to as Parcel ( 1) and ( 2) in 
1943 [Exhibit _D-5]. He was told that he was acquiring 
everything east to the "old fence" [Record p. 212]. During 
the entire time he owned the property, he occupied, used, and 
farmed the property east to the "old fence", [Record p. 213] 
until he sold in 1971, when he deeded to South [Exhibit P-14] 
telling the Buyer they were buying to the "old fence" on the 
east [Record p. 217]. Johnson never had the property surveyed 
[Record p. 222] but relied solely on the location of the 
fences to define the boundary. 
The Respondents introduced absolutely no _evidence to 
controvert the establishment of boundary by acquiescence. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 5 
In proof of Respondents claim that their title was 
based upon surveys, and deeds to the land, it was shown by 
both the Appellant's and Respondent's engineers, that 
numerous discrepancies existed with the deeds [Record p. 
293-295] , [Record p. 402] • Both surveyors agreed that the 
deeds on both~ sides of the "old fence" failed to close, and 
had errors in the description [Record p. 293, 380, 402]. 
On the east side of the "old fence" the Respondent's 
deeds overlap into Meadow Cove Subdivision by 26 feet [Record 
p. 381, 382]. The deed on Parcel (4) came with two 
descriptions [Record 385, 386], and by using the main 
description (a second description was in parenthesis) there 
was a 68 foot gap, which would closely agree with the "old 
fence" as the boundary. 
With regard to Parcel (5) the Mc Donald Tract the 
Respondent's Counsel admitted they had a problem there· 
[Record p. 391] and their own surveyor testified that the 
deed description under which the Respondents obtained Parcel 
(5) only goes to the "old fence", [Record 391, 395] and not 
to the "white fence" where Respondents seek to establish the 
boundary. 
The said Reynold Johnson having acquired title to the 
disputed strip of land, through boundary by acquiescence, he 
then deeded to the Plaintiffs/Appellants, [Exhibit P. 15]. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
RAISES NOTHING NEW, IMPORTANT, NOR SHOWS 
ANY ERROR BY THE APPELLATE COURT. 
In Respondents Pe ti ti on for Rehearing and BRIEF in 
Support of Petition for rehearing, the Respondents have again 
repeated the same issues and quoted the same cases that were 
before the Court on appeal. The Respondents failed in trial 
to introduce any evidence to dispute the boundary by acquies-
cence, and relied solely on the argument that because the 
parties to this action were not the parties between whom the 
boundary by acquiescense occurred, therefore a Court of 
Equity should ignore the doctrine and decide who would have 
the greater equity to be served. 
This reasoning is contrary to the rulings of this 
Court. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long 
been recognized to SETTLE boundary disputes, see Utah Law 
/ Review, Volume No. 1, Spring 1975 at page 224. This Court 
has made clear that a boundary established by acquiescence is 
binding not only on the acquiescing owners, but also on their 
grantees, see Johnson vs. Sessions, 25 Ut 2d 133, 477 P 2d 
788, (1970). 
In the case of Provonsha v. Johnson, 6 U 2d 26, 305 P 
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2d 486 (1956) this Court dealt with a boundary fence in place 
for some 35 years and concluded at 
"If by the time a boundary by acquie-· 
scence had been established, as we think it 
had, under principles heretofore announced 
by this Court, succeeding grantees could not 
marshal! their disagreements or misunder-
standings to destroy that established 
boundary." 
page 29: 
The Respondents re argue the same facts the appellate 
Court rejected and site the cases of Florence v. Hiline ...,...,, 
Equipment Company and Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation as 
their sole authority for the decision they seek. Both cases 
are clearly distinguishable from the present case. 
In Florence v. Hiline Equipment Company, 581, P 2d 998 
(1978) this Court concluded: 
"The trial court determined that the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescense does not apply to 
the facts of this case~ •• although the fence 
has been in existence for a number years, 
there is nothing in the record to support the 
claim that these parties have acquiesced in 
treating the fence as their mutual boundary." 
Citing the Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation case, 
this Court in Florence concluded: 
"We cannot see the circumstances as justi-
fying a conclusion that the parties acquiesc-
ed in regarding this fence as a boundary for 
the sufficiently long period of time ... Like-
wise, on the facts now before us, we must 
conclude as did the trial court that the 
parties have not by their actions relied 
upon the fence as being the true and 
actual boundary." 
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The very factual requirements missing in those two 
cases, was shown without dispute, to exist in the instant 
case, namely the true boundary line was unknown and the 
parties on both sides of the "old fence" for more than 40 
years, acquiesced and relied on the "old fence" as the 
boundary line. 
Accordingly this Court concluded in its December 18, 
1980 decision at page 2: 
"It is clear from the undisputed evidence that 
plaintiffs and their predecessors in title and 
interest had occupied, possessed and used the 
land included in the disputed strip for more 
than 40 years as the owners thereof; that the 
land had been bounded by a visible fence during 
all that time, which fence had been accepted by 
the adjoining landowners as the boundary line 
between their respective tracts of land. 
The evidence introduced at trial, by the Plaintiffs/Ap-
pellants, shows this case, without controverting evidence, to 
be the classic case of boundary by acquiescenceG 
The Respondent has in its petition reargued its appeal 
with nothing new added, no new evidence shown and no error 
shown, except that Respondents want a different decision. 
This Court has held that a rehearing should not be 
granted, where nothing new and important, was offerred for 
consideration. 
Ducheneau v. House 4 Ut 483, 11 P 618 (1886 ), further 
_\.!; 
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when the Supreme Court has considered and decided all the 
material questions involved in a case, a rehearing should not 
be applies for, unless the Court misconstr~ed some material 
fact or facts, or overlooked some statute· or some decision 
which might affect the result, or based the decision on a 
wrong principal of law. See Cummings v. Nielson 42 Ut 157, 
129 P. 619 ( 1913). 
To justify a rehearing a strong case had to be made to 
show the Court failed to consider some material point, or 
erred in its conclusion or matter was discovered which was 
unknown at the original hearing. 
See In re MacKnight 4 Ut 237, 9 P 299 ( 1886) Q 
Brown v. Pickard 4 Utah 292, 9 P 573, 11 P 512 ( 1886) ~ 
No such showing has been made by the Respondent. Were 
the Respondent's argument of equity allowed to reject 
boundary by acquiescence in the instant case, the settling of 
boundary disputes through this doctrine would become a 
nullity in this state. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLATE COURT PROPERLY REVIEWED THE LAW 
AND THE FACTS AND DETERMINED THAT THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENSE 
VESTING TITLE IN THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS. 
This Court has made clear -in numerous decisions that in 
equity cases, it is the duty and the prerogative of the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Supreme Court to review the law and the facts and if 
necessary to make its own findings and substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court. 
See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P 2d 1359 (1974); 
Kier v. Condrack, 478 P 2d 327, 25 Ut 2d 129 (1970); 
Richins v. Struhs, 412 P 2d 314, 17 Ut 2d 356 (1966); 
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 522 P 2d 136 (1976). 
Pursuant to that burden this Court reviewed the law and 
the facts and concluded at page 2: 
"It is clear from the undisputed evidence 
that Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title· 
and interest and occupied, possessed and used the 
land included in the disputed strip for more 
than 40 years as the owners thereof; that the 
land had been bounded by a visible fence during 
all that time, which fance had been accepted 
by the adjoining landowners as the boundary 
line between their respective tracts of land. 
It is also clear from the evidence that 
none of the Defendants, nor their predecessors 
in title and interest, had occupied, possessed, 
used or claimed any of the land included in 
the disputed strip for more than 40 years 
prior to the filing of the legal action in 
this matter. 
Reynold Johnson had bought the land 
west of the old fence in 1943. From that 
date until 1971, he occupies and farmed the 
land up to the old fence. He irrigated his 
crops from the ditch that ran along the old 
fence line immediately west of such fence. 
He had acquired title to the disputed strip 
of land by operation of law under the doct-
rine of boundary by acquiescence. The 
Defendants' predecessors in title and in-
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terest held good title to their lands west 
to the old fence, and only the bare record 
title to any land west of the old fence that 
was embraced within the descriptions in their 
title doc~ments. Their legal title ta any 
part of the disputed strip of land ha~ been 
extinguished when Johnson's occupancy and 
possession had riperied irtto a legal title." 
The Respondents finally attempt to find basis for 
complaint because of the judges who heard and decided the 
case., This Court has set forth the standard for Rehearing 
clearly. In Shippers Best Express, Inc. vs. Newson, 579 P 2d 
1316 (1978) this Court rejected a petition for rehearing and 
concluded that: 
"To set it aside required a vote of a 
majority of those who heard the matter, 
otherwise the judgment which was pronounced 
by a majority of the Court stands.," (at 
page 1319) 
As stated by Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion 
in the Skippers Best Express v. Newsom case at Pg 1318: 
"It is totally foreign to my conception 
of fairness and justice for a party to submit 
his controversy to a Court for adjudication, 
then wait ~o see whether he wins or loses, and 
when he loses·t~ then attack the composition 
of the court. That this may not properly be 
donee" See People, etc. Tidwell et al, 5 Ut 
88, 12 P 638; In re Thompson 72 Utah 17, 269 
p 103, 128., 
/I 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The decision of this court reaffirms the long standing 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence settling property 
disputes in the State of Utah. The Plaintiffs/Appellants 
have shown by undisputed evidence the establishment of all 
elements of boundary by acquiescence for a period in excess 
of 40 years, settling the boundary line as the "old fence". 
The Respondents have failed to show any evidence to 
controvert the application of the doctrine in this case. 
Further, the Defendants/Respondents have failed to sustain 
their own burden of showing their acquisition of the property 
through valid deeds, and have failed to show a single case in 
point which would refute the application of boundary by ac-
quiescense in this classic case. 
The Plaintiffs/Appellants therefore respectfully urge 
the Court to deny the Defendants/Respondents Pe ti ti on for 
Rehearing and affirm the unanimous decision of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this C/~ day of February, 1981. 
By 
WALKER, HINTZE & WASHBURN, INC. 
M. RICHARD WALKER 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
Suite 202, 4685 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-4747 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the Brief 
of Appellants in OPPOSITION to Respondents Petition of 
Rehearing, by mailing to STEVEN H. STEWART, Attorney for 
Respondents, at 220 South 200 East, Suite 450, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 91J day of February, 1981, postage 
prepaid. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
